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HELEN FENWICK AND GAVIN PHILLIPSON
The Human Rights Act, Public Protest and 
Judicial Activism1
Introduction1. 
In the UK in the 21st century the legal response to protest is changing. The 
terrorist acts of 9/11, the rise of terrorism thereafter and of awareness of 
terrorism, and the Iraq war have all had an impact. The deployment of criminal 
sanctions in 2006 to seek to rid Parliament Square of a lone, peaceful anti-war 
protester is only the most obvious manifestation of this change. Since the main 
statutory framework governing protest was put in place in 1986 and extended 
in 1994 under the Conservative government, there has been, this Paper will 
argue, a continued creeping criminalization, and even terrorization, of many 
forms of dissent over the ten years of Labour rule since 1997. The over-broad 
provisions introduced in 1986 and 1994 have been extended incrementally in 
a range of statutes that on their face are not concerned mainly or specifi cally 
with public order, such as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Act 2003. Accompanying incrementally increasing criminalisation 
of forms of dissent, there has recently been a more worrying trend – to use 
sanctions based on the civil standard of proof against protesters. 
 For most of those ten years the Human Rights Act (hereinafter HRA), 
which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic 
law, has also been in force – an intriguing contradiction that forms one of 
the main themes of this paper. But in exploring the contradictions in recent 
UK civil rights statutory policy, it should be remembered that the common 
law doctrine of breach of the peace eclipses all the statutory changes over 
1 This paper draws in places upon H. Fenwick & G. Phillipson, Public Protest, the Human 
Rights Act and Judicial Responses to Political Expression, 2000 Public Law 627, and upon H. 
Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (2007). 
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the last twenty years in terms of its impact on public protest. Breathtakingly 
broad, bewilderingly imprecise in scope, it provides the police with such wide 
powers to use against protesters as to render the statutory frameworks almost 
redundant. This paper has chosen to focus on that area in order to use it as an 
example of the discretion accorded to the judiciary in receiving the Convention 
into domestic law under the HRA. This paper focuses on two breach of the 
peace decisions under the HRA, Laporte2 and Austin and Saxby,3 intended to 
illustrate the leeway created by the Convention jurisprudence, especially the 
concept of proportionality, and the HRA itself for the adoption of activist or 
minimalist approaches in the public protest context. 
The Legal Response to Public Protest – The Nature of 2. 
Public Order Law in the UK
Historically, the UK has had no formal constitutional or statutory provision 
providing rights to protest and assemble. Instead, it has seen a series of often 
ill-considered and needlessly broad statutory responses to disorder. A number 
of trends inimical to public protest are discernible, carried through from 
the Public Order Act 1986, to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 1994, the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Sections 1 and 25 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA), and the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001, at present culminating in Sections 132-138 of the Serious 
and Organized Crime Act 2005, which apply to demonstrations in the vicinity 
of Parliament.
 Certain features of these statutes exhibit the traditional hallmarks of UK 
public order law, but in the more recent legislation their illiberal tendency is 
more greatly marked. These statutes are littered with imprecise terms such as 
‘disorderly’ or ‘insulting’ or ‘disruptive,’ all objectionable under rule of law 
notions since protesters cannot predict when a protest may lead to criminal 
liability. Reliance on the likelihood that police, magistrates or the CPS will 
under-enforce the law is unsatisfactory due to the likelihood that their decisions, 
in any particular instance, will not be subjected to independent scrutiny. Such 
reliance hardly provides the fi rm basis for the exercise of rights to assemble 
and to protest that one would expect to fi nd in a mature democracy. The more 
recent statutory offences tend to have the ingredients of a minimal actus reus 
and an absent, minimal, or reversed mens rea.4 But the nature of the statutory 
2 [2006] UKHL 55, Para. 34. CA: R (on the application of Laporte) v. CC of Gloucester 
Constab [2004] EWCA Civ 1639. 
3 [2005] HRLR 20; 2005 WL 699571 (QBD), (2005) 155 N.L.J. 515, 14 April 2005 Times 699, 
571, [2005] EWHC 480; 23 March 2005, Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court.
4 See the Public Order Act 1986, Secs. 14A, 14C; the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994, Sec. 69 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sec. 1. 
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provisions is only one factor contributing to the real extent of rights to protest 
and assemble. The common law power to prevent a breach of the peace outdoes 
such provisions in terms of exhibiting many of the features just criticised, and, 
as indicated, judicial infl uence in developing and interpreting public order 
law has been signifi cant. The key factor continues to be the working practice 
of the police.5 The police may already have developed a practice that renders 
a statutory power irrelevant, or they may consider that the use of the power 
would exacerbate a public order situation, rather than defusing it. The police 
may therefore tend to pick and choose among the available powers, tending to 
prefer familiar or very broad ones, particularly the power to prevent a breach 
of the peace. 
 Judicial uncertainty in applying the Convention is arising in a number of 
contexts, but public protest cases present them with an especially stark choice, 
since the HRA provides that public authorities must not infringe Articles 
10 and 11; on its face, this requirement demands a break not only with the 
traditional acceptance that there is no legal right to assemble or engage in 
public protest in the UK, but with the failure to prevent encroachment on the 
negative liberty. As indicated above, references to ‘rights’ were occasionally 
made, but they appeared to be, loosely, to negative liberties. The HRA requires 
more of public authorities than a mere voluntary tolerance of public protest 
or a recognition of freedom of assembly that can be readily abrogated.6 There 
were signs in the early post-HRA years that the judiciary, while paying lip-
service to rights to freedom of protest, were maintaining something close to 
the previous balance between public order and freedom of assembly, thereby 
failing to give full effect to Articles 10 and 11. However, the Laporte case in 
the House of Lords signalled not only a change of stance and willingness to 
break with previous tradition, but also an acknowledgement that the previous 
common law protection for protest and assembly was deeply fl awed and 
inadequate. 
Rights to Assemble and Protest under the ECHR, 3. 
Received Domestically under the Human Rights Act
Until the Convention was received into domestic law, domestic law continued to 
afford virtually no recognition to rights to meet or march.7 Now, under Section 
6 HRA, those seeking to exercise rights of protest and assembly can rely on 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, and any other relevant right,8 against 
5 See P. Waddington, Liberty and Order: Public Order Policing in a Capital City (1994).
6 See DPP v. Jones [1999] 2 WLR 625.
7 See D. G. Barnum, The Constitutional Status of Public Protest Activity in Britain and the US, 
1977 Public Law 310.
8 Art. 5 may have particular applicability.
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public authorities, in particular the police. All the legislation already mentioned 
and discussed below must, where necessary, be interpreted compatibly with 
those rights, under Section 3, taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account 
under Section 2. But, in order to evaluate the actual and potential impact of the 
Convention, under the HRA, it is necessary to consider the scope and content 
of the Articles 10 and 11 rights of protest and assembly. 
 Existing Strasbourg jurisprudence on the right to protest is fairly scanty,9 
and very few cases deal with direct action protest, which has been analysed 
under Article 1110 and, recently, Article 10.11 In Ziliberberg v. Moldova12 the 
Court made the association between assembly and expression explicit: “the 
right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society 
and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a 
society.” This stance is appropriate given the deliberate adoption of the wider 
term ‘expression’ rather than ‘speech’ in Article 10; it also avoids the problems 
experienced in the US in distinguishing between message-bearing conduct and 
conduct simpliciter. Article 11 leaves a great deal of discretion to the judiciary, 
since, in common with Articles 8-10, it contains a long list of exceptions in 
Paragraph 2. In interpreting it, the UK judiciary are obliged, under Section 2 
of the HRA, to take the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence into account. That 
jurisprudence is not, on the whole, of a radical nature, although the Court has 
found that the right to organise public meetings is ‘fundamental’13 and includes 
the right to organise marches, demonstrations and other forms of public protest. 
Article 11 may impose limited positive duties on the state to ensure that an 
assembly or a protest can occur even though it is likely to provoke others to 
violence; the responsibility for any harm caused appears to remain with the 
counter-demonstrators.14 The acceptance of further positive duties, including 
a duty to require owners of private land to allow some peaceful assemblies on 
their property, has not yet been accepted under the Convention but remains a 
possibility, especially, as Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick point out,15 in view of 
the growth of quasi-public places such as large, enclosed shopping centres and 
the privatisation of previously public places. 
9 There have been comparatively few decisions by the Court: Platform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v. 
Austria, Decision of 21 June 1988, 1988 ECHR (Ser. A., No. 139); Ezelin v. France, Decision 
of 26 April 1991, 1991 ECHR (Ser. A., No. 202); Steel, et al. v. UK, Decision of 23 September 
1998, 28 EHRR 603; Chorherr v. Austria, Decision of 25 August 1993, 1993 ECHR (Ser. A., 
No. 266); Hashman and Harrup v. UK, Decision of 25 November 1999, 30 EHRR 241; [2000] 
8 BHRC 104. Most of the jurisprudence consists of admissibility decisions in the Commission, 
fi nding that the application was manifestly ill-founded.
10 G v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, App. No. 13079/87, 21 DR 138 (1980).
11 See Steel v. UK, supra note 9; Hashman v. UK, supra note 9, at 342. 
12 App. No 61821/00 of 4 May 2004, unreported, Para 2.
13 Rassemblement Jurassien & Unité Jurassienne v. Switzerland, App. No. 8191/78, 17 DR 93 
(1979), at 119. 
14 Platform ‘Ärtze fur das Leben’ v. Austria, supra note 9, at 32.
15 M. O’Boyle et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 419 (1995).
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 It should be noted that the extensive jurisprudence on expression generally, 
especially political expression, is clearly applicable to public protest.16 The 
content of speech will rarely exclude it from Article 10 protection: thus, speech 
as part of a protest likely to cause such low level harm as alarm or distress may 
be protected according to the dicta of the Court in Müller v. Switzerland 17 
to the effect that the protection of free speech extends equally to ideas that 
“offend, shock or disturb.” The Court has repeatedly asserted that freedom 
of expression “constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society,” that exceptions to it “must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity 
for any restrictions […] convincingly established.”18 It is a well-known feature 
of the Strasbourg jurisprudence that political expression receives a high degree 
of protection. One of the leading works on the Convention concludes: “It is 
clear that the Court ascribes a hierarchy of value” to different classes of speech, 
attaching “the highest importance to the protection of political expression [...] 
widely understood.”19
 Prima facie, all forms of protest that can be viewed as the expression of an 
opinion fall within Article 10 according to the fi ndings of the Court in Steel 
v. UK.20 Thus the direct action form of protest, such as symbolic or actual 
physical obstruction, does fall within the scope of Article 10,21 a fi nding 
that was reiterated in Hashman v. UK.22 In the Steel case, the Court drew no 
distinction between actual and symbolic obstruction, and has not therefore 
considered the means by which any such distinction might manifest itself 
in the assessment of the lawfulness of state interferences with these forms 
of obstruction. It is clear only that violent or threatening protest – which, 
according to the Commission, includes “demonstration[s] where the organisers 
and participants have violent intentions that result in public disorder” – falls 
outside Article 11 and, probably, Article 10.
Justifi cations for Interferences with the Primary Rights3.1. 
Owing to the likelihood that, as indicated, most forms of protest will fall within 
Article 10, and probably also Article 11, the emphasis of Strasbourg fi ndings 
is on the Paragraph 2 exceptions, which include “in the interests of national 
security […] public safety […] for the prevention of disorder or crime […] for 
16 Steel v. UK, supra note 9.
17 Decision of 24 May 1988, 13 EHRR 212.
18 Observer and Guardian v. UK, Decision of 26 November 1991, 14 EHRR 153, at 59. 
19 Supra note 15, at 397 and 414. 
20 Supra note 9.
21 See id., at 92: “It is true that the protests took the form of physically impeding the activities 
of which the applicants disapproved, but the Court considers nonetheless that they constituted 
expressions of opinion with the meaning of Art. 10.”
22 Supra note 9.
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the protection of the […] rights of others.” Under the familiar formula, in order 
to be justifi ed, state interference with Articles 10 and 11 guarantees must be 
prescribed by law, have a legitimate aim, be necessary in a democratic society, 
and be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion (Article 14). In carrying out 
this assessment, the domestic courts are obliged to take the Strasbourg public 
protest jurisprudence into account although they are not bound by it.23
 In freedom of expression cases, Strasbourg’s main concern has been with 
the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ requirement; the notion of ‘prescribed 
by law’ has been focused upon to some extent but almost always with the result 
that it has been found to be satisfi ed. The ‘legitimate aim’ requirement will 
normally be readily satisfi ed. The requirements of precision and foreseeability 
connoted by the term ‘prescribed by law’24 have also been fl exibly applied in 
this context.25 The Court tends to afford a wide margin of appreciation when 
reviewing the necessity of interferences with expression in the form of protest, 
viewing measures taken to prevent disorder or protect the rights of others as 
peculiarly within the purview of the domestic authorities, in contrast to its 
stance in respect of ‘pure’ speech. Therefore, expression as protest tends to 
be in a precarious position. The notion of a margin of appreciation conceded 
to states permeates the Articles 10(2) and 11(2) public protest jurisprudence, 
although it has not infl uenced the interpretation of the substantive rights. 
 In fi nding that applications are manifestly ill founded, the Commission 
has been readily satisfi ed that decisions of the national authorities to adopt 
quite far-reaching measures, including complete bans, in order to prevent 
disorder are within their margin of appreciation.26 The Court has also 
found “the margin of appreciation extends in particular to the choice of the 
reasonable and appropriate means to be used by the authority to ensure that 
lawful manifestations can take place peacefully.”27 Thus, states are typically 
not required to demonstrate that lesser measures than those actually taken 
would have been inadequate to deal with the threats posed by demonstrations 
– disorder, interferences with the rights of others, and so on. 
 The effect of this ‘light touch’ review may also be seen in the tendency 
to deal with crucial issues – typically proportionality, but also in some cases 
the scope of the primary right28 – in such a brusque and abbreviated manner 
that explication for the fi ndings is either non-existent or takes the form of 
23 HRA 1998, Sec. 2(1).
24 Sunday Times v. UK, Decision of 26 April 1979, 2 EHRR 245, at 49.
25 See, e.g., Rai, Allmond and ‘Negotiate Now’ v. UK, App. No. 25522/94, 19 EHRR CD 93 
(1995).
26 See Christians against Racism and Fascism v. UK, App. No. 8440/78, 21 DR 138 (1980); and 
Friedl v. Austria, No. 15225/89 (1992), unreported.
27 Chorherr v. Austria, supra note 9, at 31.
28 See the crucial fi ndings in Steel v. UK, supra note 9; Hashman and Harrup v. UK, supra note 
9; and G v. FRG, supra note 10, that direct action fell within the scope of Arts. 10 and 11.
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mere assertion. Moreover, the jurisprudence is, in general, markedly under-
theorised, in notable contrast to that concerning media expression. 
It is fair to say that little recognition of the distinctive value of public protest as 
compared to other forms of political discussion is apparent from the case law; 
moreover […] general principles have not played [a] great […] part in cases 
involving public protest.29 
In the Steel case,30 for example, which, as indicated, concerned interferences 
with the freedom of expression of fi ve applicants, the proportionality of 
the arrest and seventeen-hour detention of the second applicant and her 
subsequent imprisonment for seven days on refusing to be bound over is airily 
determined, in a mere two sentences. The applicant was physically impeding 
digging equipment by sitting on the ground. The Court’s fi nding was that 
her arrest and detention was justifi ed as necessary to prevent disorder and 
protect the rights of others.31 But these grounds had scant substantiation: it 
was accepted that no violent incidents or damage to property had been caused 
by the road protesters (Paragraph 15) and the conduct of the applicant had 
been entirely peaceful: she had never resisted being removed from the area 
by security guards – so it is hard to see wherein lay the ‘risk of disorder,’32 
still less why it was suffi cient to justify such comparatively drastic action. As 
for ‘the rights of others,’ the Court, rather extraordinarily, nowhere said what 
these ‘rights’ were, although presumably the judges had in mind the fact that 
the road builders were engaged in a lawful activity – building a road – which 
the protesters were disrupting. The issue of the gravity of the interference 
with these ‘rights’ was not touched upon: the road builders did have security 
guards, and were apparently able to carry on with their work, at the cost of 
some inconvenience. In neither case was the question of alternative means 
of protecting the road builders even adverted to, much less subjected to any 
analysis. In other words, one of the justifi catory grounds for the interference 
with Article 10 rights was unsubstantiated by any real evidence; the other 
was subject to no analysis at all. Very similar tendencies may be seen in the 
Commission decisions in Pendragon33 and Chappell,34 in which blanket 
bans on assemblies at and around the ancient Stonehenge monument were 
found justifi able by the Commission, on the basis of virtually no evidence or 
reasoning. 
29 See H. Fenwick, Public Protest, supra note 1, at 629-630.
30 Supra note 9.
31 Id., at 109. 
32 The fi rst applicant, it found, “had created a danger of serious physical injury to herself and 
others and had formed part of a protest which risked culminating in disorder and violence” (id., 
at 105). Neither of these factors was present in relation to the second applicant, so the reference 
was not only worthless, but positively misleading (though the Court did note that the risk of 
disorder was ‘arguably less serious than that caused by the fi rst applicant’ (id., at 109).
33 Pendragon v. UK, App. No. 31416/96, Decision of 19 October 1998, unreported.
34 Chappell v. UK, App. No. 12587/86, 53 DR 241 (1987).
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 In contrast, in Ezelin v. France,35 the Court took a ‘hard look’ at the issue 
of proportionality. The applicant, an advocate, took part in a demonstration 
against the judicial system generally and against particular judges, involving 
the daubing of slogans attacking the judiciary on court walls, and eventual 
violence. Ezelin did not himself take part in any illegal acts, but did not 
disassociate himself from the march, even when it became violent. He was 
disciplined by the Bar Association and eventually given a formal reprimand, 
which did not impair his ability to practice. No fi ne was imposed. The French 
Government’s argument was that, “By not disavowing the unruly incidents 
that had occurred during the demonstration, the applicant had ipso facto 
approved them [and that] it was essential for judicial institutions to react to 
behaviour which, on the part of an ‘offi cer of the court’ [...] seriously impaired 
the authority of the judiciary and respect or court decisions.”36 The argument 
was rejected; Article 11 was found to have been violated. In an emphatic 
judgment, the Court found: 
[...] the freedom to take part in a peaceful assembly – in this instance a 
demonstration that had not been prohibited – is of such importance that it cannot 
be restricted in any way, even for an advocate, so long as the person concerned 
does not himself commit any reprehensible act on such an occasion.37
Conclusions3.2. 
The broad phrasing of Articles 10 and 1138 inevitably leave a great deal of 
interpretative discretion to the UK judiciary in considering their application 
to existing law. But certain conclusions can be drawn: the Court will not 
tolerate the arrest and detention of purely peaceful protesters, even if the 
protest degenerates into violence, so long as the protesters in question have 
not themselves committed ‘reprehensible acts.’ Thus, apart from violent or 
threatening protest, most forms of protest and assembly are within the scope 
of both Articles 10 and 11, although ceremonious processions and assemblies 
will probably be considered only within Article 11,39 while the recent tendency 
is to consider forms of direct action within Article 10. All the forms of protest 
mentioned above, apart from the last two, appear to be covered. Thus, forms of 
protest including those far removed from the classic peaceful assembly holding 
up banners or handing out leafl ets engage these Articles, but interference with 
direct action protest can be readily justifi ed, even where the action is primarily 
of a symbolic nature. 
35 Supra note 9.
36 Id., at 49.
37 Id., at 53.
38 Arts. 5 and 6 may also be relevant in some circumstances.
39 See Chorherr v. Austria, supra note 9.
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 Nevertheless, it is evident that the application of the above case law without 
more might do little to structure the domestic judicial discretion, leaving the 
courts free to apply Articles 10 and 11 so that they constitute little or no check 
upon police discretion over assemblies and demonstrations on the ground. 
How far this is the case depends crucially upon two factors: fi rst, the attitude 
of the domestic courts towards the margin of appreciation doctrine and any 
domestic equivalent; and secondly, how far they are prepared to make any use 
of the more fundamental principles underlying Convention jurisprudence on 
political expression generally. These factors were of special signifi cance in the 
two decisions focused upon in this paper. 
The Domestic Application of Articles 10 and 114. 
Two opposing judicial approaches to the application of the Convention can 
be identifi ed, although it must be pointed out that judicial reasoning cannot 
always be neatly pigeonholed. It is suggested below that the two approaches 
are of special signifi cance in this context, since the common law has failed to 
afford the protection to freedom of protest and assembly that has been evident 
at Strasbourg. This is clearly not a context in which the tendency of the 
common law has been to achieve high standards of human rights protection, 
as Lord Bingham acknowledged in Laporte. If the judges fail to abandon their 
traditional approach in favour of a more activist stance, under the impetus of the 
HRA, it will continue to be the case that the freedoms of protest and assembly 
receive less recognition in the UK than in other comparable democracies.
 As commentators have agreed40 and the House of Lords has stressed,41 the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, as such, should not be applied by domestic 
courts, since it is a distinctively international law doctrine. Applying the 
Convention without such reliance has two aspects. It means, fi rst, refusing to 
import the doctrine into domestic decision-making on the Convention where 
no Strasbourg decision is in point, and, secondly, where such a decision is in 
point, seeking to apply it but to disentangle the margin of appreciation aspects 
from it. This might mean giving consideration to the likely outcome of the 
case at Strasbourg had the doctrine been disregarded. 
40 See Sir J. Laws, The Limitations of Human Rights, 1998 Public Law 254, at 258; D. Feldman, 
The Human Rights Act and Constitutional Principles, 19 Legal Studies 165, at 192 (1999); D. 
Pannick, Principles of Interpretation of Convention Rights under the Human Rights Act and the 
Discretionary Area of Judgment, 1998 Public Law 545; M. Hunt, R. Singh & M. Demetriou, 
Is there a Role for the ‘Margin of Appreciation’ in National Law after the Human Rights Act?, 
1999 EHRLR 15, at 17. 
41 R. v. DPP ex parte Kebilene and Others [1999] 3 WLR 972, at 1043, per Lord Hope: “[the 
doctrine] is not available to the national courts ....” See dicta to like effect in R v. Stratford JJ ex 
parte Imbert, [1999] 163 JP 693 per Buxton LJ. 
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 However, as discussed above, the reasoning in much of the case law is quite 
sparse and tokenistic, the doctrine having had the effect, not of infl uencing a 
particular part of the judgment in a clear way, but simply of rendering the 
whole assessment quite rudimentary. Therefore, stripping away the effects 
of the doctrine might merely mean treating certain judgments as non-
determinative of the points raised at the domestic level. Certainly, domestic 
courts minded to make an intensive inquiry into questions of proportionality 
will receive little aid from the cases described above in so doing. So far in the 
post-HRA domestic case law, there is little evidence that the judges appreciate 
the fact that they are in a sense importing the margin of appreciation aspects 
of Strasbourg decisions into domestic law by the back-door. 
Minimalism4.1. 
This is a context in which the possible stances that the domestic judiciary 
might adopt when confronted with public order cases raising Articles 10 and 
11 issues are, it is argued, quite clearly opposed. A minimalist approach might 
be, in this context, almost indistinguishable from what might be termed a 
‘traditionalist’ one and might yield similar results, since this is a fi eld in which 
the judiciary have, since Beatty v. Gillbanks,42 almost invariably eschewed an 
activist approach. A minimalist approach could be justifi ed on the basis that a 
balance has always been struck in UK law between freedom of assembly and 
public order by reference either to common law principle or parliamentary 
restraint; with only two exceptions,43 that balance has been found to accord 
with Articles 10 and 11 at Strasbourg,44 and therefore there is no reason to 
disturb it now. Under this approach, the courts, while pronouncing the margin 
of appreciation doctrine inapplicable, would not take the further step of 
recognising and making due allowance for its infl uence on the cases applied. 
 Thus, judges could rely simplistically and solely on the outcomes of 
decisions at Strasbourg – most of which are adverse to the applicants – without 
adverting to its infl uence on those outcomes. Thus, they could import its effects 
– ‘light touch’ review and therefore a ‘soft-edged’ proportionality standard 
likely to catch only grossly unreasonable decisions – into domestic decision 
making. The traditionalist judge would tend to take the view that common 
law principle has long recognised values that are coterminous with the factors 
taken into account at Strasbourg in evaluating the balance in question, and that, 
42 [1882] 9 QBD 308.
43 See the fi ndings of the Court under Art. 10 regarding the third, fourth and fi fth applicants in 
Steel v. UK and Hashman and Harrup v. UK, supra note 9. 
44 See, e.g., Chappell v. UK, (1989) 10 EHRR 510; Christians Against Racism and Fascism v. 
UK, supra note 26; the fi ndings as regards Steel and Lush in Steel v. UK, supra note 9. 
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in most instances, the outcome of cases would not differ whether freedom of 
expression was viewed as a common law principle or as protected under the 
Convention. 
 Since, under the HRA, the courts have to take account of rights to protest as 
opposed to negative liberties, these approaches had to be modifi ed in order to 
provide a little more protection for such rights than was provided previously. 
Under the HRA, the courts must apply a more rigorous proportionality 
doctrine. But where different views might be taken of the need for a particular 
interference, such as a ban imposed on a march under Section 13 of the Public 
Order Act 1986, a domestic court fully applying the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
including its margin of appreciation aspects, under Section 2 HRA, would tend 
to defer to the judgment of the executive. This would entail the type of low-
intensity inquiry into the existence of a ‘pressing social need’ to restrict rights 
to protest typifi ed by the Strasbourg case law, albeit adopted for somewhat 
different reasons. The issue of whether less intrusive means could have been 
adopted would either be ignored or treated as an issue of police expertise, 
to which the courts should likewise defer. The decision in Austin and Saxby 
considered below is put forward as a signifi cant and telling example of post-
HRA minimalist judicial reasoning.
Activism 4.2. 
The approach under the HRA, which was adopted in 2006 by the House of 
Lords in Laporte, may be referred to as ‘activist’;45 it starts from the premise 
that the reception of the Convention into UK law represents a decisive break 
with the past. Under this approach, judges regard themselves as required to go 
beyond the minimal standards applied in the Strasbourg jurisprudence,46 given 
that Strasbourg’s view of itself as a system of protection fi rmly subsidiary 
to that afforded by national courts has led it, particularly in public protest 
cases, to intervene only where clear and unequivocal transgressions have 
occurred. Such a stance recognises that, as a consequence, most of the cases on 
peaceful protest have not in fact required national authorities to demonstrate 
convincingly that the test of ‘pressing social need’ has been met. Furthermore, 
signifi cantly, the courts can look for assistance to the general principles 
developed by Strasbourg.47 A foundational Strasbourg principle, repeated in 
45 H. Fenwick, Civil Rights: New Labour, Freedom and the Human Rights Act 502-505 (2000).
46 In the words of Judge Martens, “[the task of domestic courts] goes further than seeing that 
the minimum standards laid down in the ECHR are maintained [...] because the ECHR’s 
injunction to further realise human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the preamble 
is also addressed to domestic courts.” (Opinion: incorporating the Convention: the role of the 
judiciary, 1998 EHRLR 3.
47 See Fenwick, supra note 45, at 502-503. As the House of Lords recently stressed: “in the 
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a number of cases, is that “the right to freedom of peaceful assembly [...] is 
a fundamental right in a democratic society, and, like the right to freedom of 
expression, is one of the foundations of such a society [...].”48 
 The HRA opened the way for the domestic courts to take to heart the principle 
– declared by Strasbourg. but not given practical effect by it – that peaceful 
protest has equal weight to freedom of expression generally, a freedom that is 
accorded ‘special importance’ within the Strasbourg jurisprudence,49 and now, 
with the House of Lords judgment in Laporte, within the common law. That 
judgment clearly marked a turning point, not only in the UK public protest 
jurisprudence generally, but also in the post-HRA jurisprudence. It stands in 
marked contrast to the other relatively recent House of Lords’ decision in 
this context – in DPP v. Jones, taken immediately prior to the coming into 
force of the HRA, a much more cautious decision. Now that the freedom of 
expression dimension of public protest has been given domestic recognition 
in Laporte, following Steel, the principles developed in the Strasbourg and 
domestic media freedom jurisprudence can be utilised in protest cases, thus 
underpinning and guiding judicial activism. 
The Common Law Doctrine of Breach of the Peace5. 
The leading case on breach of the peace is Howell,50 in which it was determined 
that a breach of the peace will arise if an act is done or threatened to be done 
which either: harms a person or his property in his presence, or is likely to 
cause such harm, or which puts a person in fear of such harm. Under this 
defi nition, threatening words might not in themselves amount to a breach of 
the peace, but they might lead a police offi cer to apprehend a breach. The 
Howell defi nition in itself is extremely wide, largely because it does not confi ne 
itself to violence or threats of violence. Nor does it require that the behaviour 
amounting to a breach of the peace, or giving rise to fear of a breach of the 
peace, should be unlawful under civil or criminal law. Further, it has been 
recognised for some time by the courts that a person may be bound over for 
conduct which is not itself a breach of the peace and which does not suggest 
that the individual concerned is about to breach the peace, but which may 
cause another to breach the peace.51 This third possibility is arguably implicit 
in the Howell defi nition itself and indeed is not suffi ciently distinguished, 
national courts also the Convention should be seen as an expression of fundamental principles 
rather than as a set of mere rules” (R v. DPP ex parte Kebilene, supra note 41). 
48 Rassemblement Jurassien v. Switzerland, supra note 13, at 119.
49 The Court referred to “the special importance of freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom 
of expression, which are closely linked in this instance” (Ezelin v. France, supra note 9, at 
51).
50 R v. Howell, [1981] 3 All ER 383.
51 Wise v. Dunning, [1902] 1 KB 167; Lansbury v. Riley [1914] 3 KB 229.
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within that defi nition, from conduct which in itself amounts to a breach of 
the peace. This additional possibility is of great signifi cance in the context of 
public protest since it means that in certain circumstances peaceful, lawful 
protest can lead to the arrest and binding over of the protesters.
 A constable or citizen has the power and duty to seek to prevent, by arrest or 
other action short of arrest, any breach of the peace occurring in his presence, 
or any breach of the peace which (having occurred) is likely to be renewed, 
or any breach of the peace which is about to occur. Three key issues arise in 
relation to the question of immediacy. First, it is necessary to determine the 
degree of imminence. In other words, does it indicate that the offi cer predicts 
that the breach will occur in the very near future? At what point could it be 
said that the point at which it was expected to arise was too distant to justify 
intervening action, including arrest? Secondly, assuming that a breach can 
be said to be imminent, who can be arrested or otherwise affected by police 
intervention? If – as may frequently occur in relation to protests – an innocent 
party is in the company of those who are, in the view of the police offi cers, 
about to commit the breach, can the police arrest or take other interventionary 
action against the innocent party? In the interests of maintaining public order, 
this might be argued for on the basis that it was diffi cult for the police to 
distinguish between those about to breach the peace and others.52 Or, it might 
be advocated on the basis that those remaining present while others, part of 
the same protest, become more confrontational, condoned or even encouraged 
the breach by their very presence or by their verbal support for the protest. 
This issue is a diffi cult one since police consider that some activist groups use 
protests as a cover for acts of violence and aggression.53 Third, if a breach can 
not be said to be imminent, can the police take action short of arrest, such as 
directing protesters away from the protest, or detaining them without arresting 
them, on the basis that otherwise the breach will become imminent? In other 
words, is the degree of intervention linked to the degree of immediacy? 
 The leading authority on the question of what is an imminent breach of 
the peace (which was accepted in the House of Lords in Laporte, discussed 
below) is Albert v. Lavin.54 That case refl ected the trend of existing authority. In 
Humphries v. Connor,55 Judge Fitzgerald said that “if a breach of the peace is 
imminent [a constable], may, if necessary, arrest those who are about to commit 
it, if it cannot otherwise be prevented.” Once it is accepted that an arrest may 
be made in respect of an apprehended breach of the peace, the question of the 
necessary degree of immediacy (the fi rst issue identifi ed) arises. A number of 
authorities establish that the duty to arrest for breach of the peace arises only 
52 This was the case in both Laporte and Austin and Saxby, which are considered below. 
53 Id. 
54 [1982] AC 546.
55 [1864] 17 ICLR 1, at 8-9.
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when the police offi cer apprehends that a breach of the peace is “imminent”56 
or is “about to take place” or is “about to be committed” (Albert v. Lavin) or 
will take place “in the immediate future” (R v. Howell). His apprehension 
“must relate to the near future” (McLeod v. Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis).57 If the offi cer reasonably apprehends that a breach of the peace is 
likely to occur in the near future, the offi cer’s duty is to take reasonable steps 
to prevent it. When this power, in conjunction with the offence of obstruction 
of an offi cer in the execution of his duty, was used extensively during the 1984 
UK miners’ strike,58 it was made clear that an arrest can occur well before the 
point is reached at which a breach of the peace is apprehended.
 The most notorious instance of its use occurred in Moss v. McLachlan.59 
A group of striking miners in a convoy of cars were stopped by the police a 
few miles away from a number of collieries and prevented from travelling 
on to pits a few miles away where non-striking miners were working. The 
police offi cers had reason to believe that violent clashes would break out, not 
at the motorway exit where their cordon was positioned, but at the pits. The 
police told them that they feared a breach of the peace if the miners reached 
the pits and that they would arrest the miners for obstruction if they tried to 
continue. After some time, a group of miners tried to push past the police, 
were arrested and convicted of obstruction of a police offi cer in the course of 
his duty. Their appeal on the ground that the offi cers had not been acting in 
the course of their duty was dismissed. It was said that there was no need to 
show that individual miners would cause a breach of the peace, nor even to 
specify at which pit disorder was expected. A reasonable belief that there was 
a real risk that a breach would occur in close proximity to the point of arrest 
(the pits were between two and four miles away) was all that was necessary. 
(A case in Kent in which striking miners were held up over 200 miles away 
from their destination suggests that this requirement of close proximity may 
be becoming otiose.)60
 In assessing whether a real risk existed, news about disorder at previous 
pickets could be taken into account; in other words, there did not appear to be 
a requirement that there was anything about these particular miners to suggest 
they might cause a breach of the peace. Thus, a number of individuals were 
lawfully denied their freedom of both movement and assembly apparently on 
no more substantial grounds than that other striking miners had caused trouble 
56 O’Kelly v. Harvey, [1998] 3 All ER 705, 711b-c; Foulkes v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside 
Police, [1982] QB 416, 426.
57 [1994] 4 All ER 553, 560F.
58 March 1984 to March 1985.
59 [1985] IRLR 76.
60 Foy v. Chief Constable of Kent, 20 March 1984, unreported. It has also been noted by P. 
Thornton, Public Order Law 97-98 (1987), that the Attorney General, in a written answer to a 
parliamentary question tabled during the miners’ strike, omitted the requirement of an imminent 
threat to public order.
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in the past, without having themselves provided grounds on which violence 
could be foreseen. Judge Skinner, giving the judgment of the Divisional 
Court, also introduced a signifi cant modifi cation to the doctrine. Dealing 
with the requirement of imminence, Judge Skinner said: “The imminence or 
immediacy of the threat to the peace determines what action is reasonable.” 61 
In Minto v. Police62 Judge Cooke said that “the degree of immediacy is plainly 
highly relevant to the reasonableness or otherwise of the action taken by the 
police offi cer.” On this approach, a police offi cer has the power – and duty – to 
take action short of arrest (such as stopping cars or directing protesters away 
from a protest) at an earlier stage than that at which he would have the power 
and duty to arrest persons on the grounds of breach of the peace.
The 5.1. Laporte Case
The highly signifi cant decision of the House of Lords in Laporte did not 
add much to the established understanding of the meaning of immediacy. 
However, it did address the question of action that can be taken when a breach 
is not imminent (the second issue identifi ed above). The stance taken in Moss 
to the effect that action short of arrest can be taken if a breach of the peace is 
not imminent was decisively rejected by the House of Lords in Laporte.63 The 
case arose in relation to the detention of protesters on a coach, which had been 
turned back by the police from an anti-war demonstration. The case arose 
since the claimant, a peace protester, wanted to protest against the policy and 
conduct of the United Kingdom and United States governments in relation to 
the Iraq war, and wished to join a protest at RAF Fairford in order to do so. 
 The claimant joined a group of about 120 passengers who boarded three 
coaches at Euston bound for Fairford. The three coaches were stopped by the 
police at Lechlade near Fairford. The police searched the coaches and found 
a few items that could possibly have been used in a non-peaceful protest, 
such as face masks and home-made shields. All these articles were seized. It 
appeared that all or some of the passengers were not questioned about their 
intentions or affi liations. After the search the coaches and passengers were 
directed by the offi cer in charge to be escorted by the police back to London. 
The offi cer took the view that had the coaches been permitted to continue to 
RAF Fairford, the protesters on the coaches would have been arrested upon 
arrival at RAF Fairford, since a breach of the peace would then have been 
‘imminent.’ He stated that he had concluded that he had a choice of either 
allowing the coaches to proceed and managing a breach of the peace at RAF 
Fairford, arresting the occupants of the coaches in order to prevent a breach 
61 Moss v. McLachlan, supra note 59, at 79, Para. 24.
62 [1987] 1 NZLR 374, at 377.
63 [2006] UKHL 55, Para. 34. Laporte case, supra note 2. 
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of the peace, or turning the coaches around and escorting them away from the 
area in order to avert a breach of the peace. The passengers were not allowed 
to disembark from the coaches. 
 The claimant issued an application for judicial review, seeking to challenge 
the actions of the Chief Constable in (1) preventing her travelling to the 
demonstration in Fairford, and forcing her to leave the area, and (2) forcibly 
returning her to London, keeping her on the coach and preventing her from 
leaving it until she had reached London. Relying on Sunday Times v. United 
Kingdom (No. 2)64 and Hashman and Harrup v. United Kingdom,65 Lord 
Bingham in the House of Lords found that 
[…] any prior restraint on freedom of expression calls for the most careful 
scrutiny […]. The Strasbourg court will wish to be satisfi ed not merely that a 
state exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith, but also 
that it applied standards in conformity with Convention standards and based its 
decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.66 
He noted that the protection of the Articles may be denied “if the demonstration 
is unauthorised and unlawful (as in the case of Ziliberberg67), or if conduct is 
such as actually to disturb public order (as in Chorherr v. Austria68).” But he 
noted this fi nding in Ziliberberg:
[…] an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a 
result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the 
course of the demonstration, if the individual in question remains peaceful in 
his or her own intentions or behaviour.69
The key argument on behalf of Laporte was that subject to Articles 10(2) 
and 11(2) of the European Convention, the claimant had a right to attend the 
lawful assembly at RAF Fairford in order to express her strong opposition 
to the war against Iraq. The conduct of the police, in stopping the coach on 
which the claimant was travelling at Lechdale, and not allowing it to continue 
its intended journey to Fairford, was an interference by a public authority 
(Section 6 HRA) with the claimant’s exercise of her rights under Articles 
10 and 11. The burden of justifying an interference with the exercise of a 
Convention right such as those protected by Articles 10 and 11 was on the 
public authority that has interfered with such exercise, in this case the Chief 
Constable. The interference by the Chief Constable in this case was for a 
legitimate purpose – the interests of national security, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights of others – but (a) was not 
64 Decision of 26 November 1991, 14 EHRR 229, at 51.
65 Supra note 9, at 32.
66 Lord Bingham took this phrase from Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, App. 
No. 28793/02, Decision of 14 May 2006, unreported, at 70.
67 App. No. 61821/00, Decision of 4 May 2004, unreported.
68 Supra note 9.
69 Supra note 67, at 2.
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prescribed by law, because it was not warranted under domestic law, and (b) it 
was not necessary in a democratic society, because it was (i) premature and (ii) 
indiscriminate; accordingly it was disproportionate. As regards the argument 
that the Chief Constable’s interference was not prescribed by law because it 
was not warranted by domestic legal authority, it was argued that there is a 
power and duty resting on constables to prevent a breach of the peace that 
reasonably appears to be about to be committed. The test is the same whether 
the intervention is by arrest or (as in Humphries v. Connor, King v. Hodges 
and Albert v. Lavin itself) by action short of arrest. But it was argued that there 
is nothing in domestic authority to support the proposition that action short of 
arrest may be taken when a breach of the peace is not as imminent as would 
be necessary to justify an arrest. Here, the offi cer in charge did not think that 
a breach of the peace was so imminent as to justify an arrest. Counsel for the 
police relied on Moss v. McLachlan,70 which is discussed above, in support 
of an argument that it is not necessary to show that the breach of the peace 
was so imminent as to justify an arrest. But the House of Lords rejected this 
argument and accepted that there is nothing in domestic authority to support 
the proposition that action short of arrest may be taken when a breach of the 
peace is not as imminent as would be necessary to justify an arrest. Lord 
Bingham took this view partly on the basis that otherwise the common law 
doctrine would undermine the 1986 Act: 
Parliament conferred carefully defi ned powers and imposed carefully defi ned 
duties on chief offi cers of police and the senior police offi cer. Offences were 
created and defences provided. Parliament plainly appreciated the need for 
appropriate police powers to control disorderly demonstrations but was 
also sensitive to the democratic values inherent in recognition of a right to 
demonstrate. It would, I think, be surprising if, alongside these closely defi ned 
powers and duties, there existed a common law power and duty, exercisable 
and imposed not only by and on any constable but by and on every member 
of the public, bounded only by an uncertain and undefi ned condition of 
reasonableness.71 
He found that Albert v. Lavin had laid down a simple and workable test, readily 
applicable to constable and private citizen alike, which recognised the power 
and duty to act in an emergency to prevent a breach of the peace, and that there 
would in almost all circumstances be little doubt as to whom to take action 
against. He further found little support in the authorities for the proposition 
that action short of arrest may be taken to prevent a breach of the peace that 
is not suffi ciently imminent to justify arrest. Since the police offi cer in charge 
did not consider that the claimant could properly be arrested when the coaches 
were stopped before reaching Fairford, it followed that action short of arrest 
could not be taken as an alternative. He also did not accept the fi nding of 
70 Supra note 59.
71 Id., at 46. 
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the Court of Appeal that the present case is “very much on all fours with the 
decision in Moss v. McLachlan.”72 He found that Moss carried the notion of 
imminence to extreme limits, but that it was not unreasonable to view the 
apprehended breach as imminent. But he considered that the situation in Moss 
differed greatly from that in the instant case in which 120 passengers, by no 
means all of whom were or were thought to be Womble members, had been 
prevented from proceeding to an assembly point that was some distance away 
from the scene of a lawful demonstration. He concluded that the actions of the 
police in turning away the passengers on the coach and then detaining them on 
the coach were not prescribed by law.
 Counsel for the claimant also contended that the police action at Lechlade 
failed the Convention test of proportionality because it was premature and 
indiscriminate. It was argued that the action was premature because there was 
no hint of disorder at Lechlade and no reason to apprehend an immediate 
outburst of disorder by the claimant and her fellow passengers when they left 
their coaches at the designated drop-off points in Fairford. Since the action 
was premature it was necessarily indiscriminate because the police could 
not at that stage identify those (if any) of the passengers who appeared to be 
about to commit a breach of the peace. Lord Bingham found that it was not 
reasonable to suppose that the passengers – apart from the Womble members 
– wanted a violent confrontation with the police. It was also unreasonable, he 
found, to anticipate that disorder would immediately occur on arrival of the 
passengers at the protest site. He noted that during that time the police would be 
in close attendance and able to identify and arrest those who showed a violent 
propensity or breached the conditions to which the assembly and procession 
were subject. He found therefore that it was wholly disproportionate to restrict 
the claimant’s exercise of her rights under Articles 10 and 11 because she was 
in the company of others, some of whom might, at some time in the future, 
breach the peace. 
 This decision is broadly in accordance with the stance taken in McLeod v. 
UK,73 in which it was found that it is insuffi cient to fi nd that a breach may occur 
at some future point, but is not immediately probable. As discussed above, 
much of the case law is in accordance with McLeod in establishing that (a) 
an arrest for breach of the peace can only occur when the breach is imminent, 
meaning – to occur in the near future – and (b) that if it is not imminent, action 
short of arrest cannot be taken. However, in Laporte,74 the Divisional Court 
and the Court of Appeal both adopted the approach in Moss, which allowed 
for preventive action short of arrest in relation to apprehended breaches of 
the peace that were not imminent. The House of Lords has now rejected that 
possibility as representing an illegitimate broadening of the breach of the peace 
72 Id., at 45.
73 Decision of 23 September 1998, 27 EHRR 493.
74 [2004] EWCA Civ 1639; [2005] QB 678.
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doctrine. In requiring a clear element of immediacy, this decision has created 
a strong inhibitory rule, not as to the powers that can be invoked under this 
doctrine, but as to the point at which it can be invoked. However, the Lords 
could have made a clearer pronouncement on the requirements of immediacy. 
They accepted that Moss took a somewhat lax view of what could be termed 
imminent, but did not reject that view. The Lords also accepted that preventive 
action short of arrest can be used under this doctrine where an arrest could be 
made for an imminent breach of the peace. Thus the police still retain wide 
powers under this doctrine to interfere with the actions of protesters so long 
as the element of immediacy is present. That element has to be judged by the 
offi cer on the ground, who may well take a very broad view of what constitutes 
an imminent breach of the peace. When such a view is taken, it is unlikely in 
practice that decisions to, for example, disperse protesters or impede them in 
travelling to the site of the protest will ever be challenged in court, and the 
impact of the protest will merely be diminished. Nevertheless, this decision 
is likely to have some impact in protest situations in which it would be very 
diffi cult to argue that a breach of the peace was imminent. 
 This judgment took the court’s duties under the HRA seriously. The 
Strasbourg jurisprudence was quite closely analysed and the facts in question 
were subjected to close scrutiny under the doctrine of proportionality. The 
very real possibility that the common law could undermine a carefully crafted 
statutory scheme was recognized and, at least to an extent, avoided. Interestingly, 
the actions of the police were found not only to be disproportionate to the 
aim pursued, they were also found not to be prescribed by law. The starting 
point was the signifi cance of upholding rights to protest. Laporte has offered 
a check to further development of the doctrine of breach of the peace and 
has recognized the ‘constitutional shift’ that the HRA has brought about in 
this context. Had the judgment gone the other way, it would have left intact 
a position whereby the police had carte blanche to order peaceful protesters 
away from the scene of a protest, stop cars proceeding to it, and detain persons, 
without arresting them, whenever a few of the protesters appeared likely to 
cause disorder or were causing it. That would have continued to render much 
of the Public Order Act 1986, as amended, effectively redundant, since it 
would continue to be unnecessary in most circumstances to rely on its powers 
to impose conditions on marches and assemblies. 
 But the impact of Laporte must not be over-stated. It curbed the use of 
common law powers only where a breach of the peace could not be said to be 
imminent. A range of interventions, including arrest or short of arrest, is still 
available to the police so long as it can be said that a breach of the peace is 
imminent. Thus, the statutory scheme is still highly likely to be marginalized. 
If a large group of protesters appears to the police to contain some unruly 
or aggressive, or potentially aggressive, elements, the police appear, post-
Laporte, to retain very broad powers to intervene. 
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Austin and Saxby5.2.  v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis75
This point brings this discussion to the third issue identifi ed above, which 
arose in the highly controversial case of Austin and Saxby. The decision 
concerned a political demonstration against capitalism and globalization that 
was organised in the heart of the West End of London on May Day 2001. 
Publicity material had given the police reason to believe that it would begin 
at 4 p.m., but in fact, it started two hours earlier. About 3,000 people had 
gathered in Oxford Circus and thousands more in the surrounding streets. 
The protest was made up of disparate groups, some of whom, according to 
police intelligence, had been involved in violent acts during protests in the 
past. The fi rst claimant, Austin, took part in the demonstration and made 
political speeches using a megaphone. The second claimant, Saxby, had come 
to London on business and had inadvertently become caught up in the crowd. 
The police stated that they had been taken by surprise by the timing of the 
demonstration and, in order to prevent a breakdown of law and order, detained 
thousands of demonstrators for about seven hours in the street by forming a 
cordon around them. The cordon was absolute, in that persons were completely 
trapped in the area for the whole seven-hour period in cold and uncomfortable 
conditions and without recourse to any facilities. The police planned to release 
the crowd slowly but this was hindered, according to the police evidence, by 
some outbreaks of disorder or violence either from the trapped group or from 
persons outside the cordon. It was considered unsafe to release groups, but a 
few individuals were released because, for example, they were suffering panic 
attacks. The claimants asked to be released but were refused on the ground 
that some protesters were threatening a breach of the peace. The claimants had 
not created a threat, nor had they provoked others. They remained peaceable 
throughout the period. 
 The claimants brought a claim for damages, alleging false imprisonment 
and also deprivation of liberty, contrary to Article 5 ECHR, raising the 
claim under Section 7 HRA. Some 150 other persons trapped that day had 
given notice of, or commenced, legal proceedings for damages against the 
Commissioner. The two cases of the claimants, Austin and Saxby, were not 
strictly test cases, but the decisions on the issues arising in the two cases were 
considered by the judge to enable most, if not all, of the other claims to be 
settled by agreement. The issues under the tort action and under Article 5 were 
dealt with separately since the judge found that different factors were relevant 
in both claims. He found that in a claim for false imprisonment the burden of 
proof rested on the claimant to prove the imprisonment and on the defendant 
to prove the justifi cation for it. If the detention fell within Article 5, the burden 
of proof, he found, lay on the defendant to bring the case within one of the 
75 Supra note 3.
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exhaustive list of exceptions to Article 5(1), but if the question was whether 
the detention fell within Article 5(1), the burden was on the claimant. 
 The judge noted that in HL v. United Kingdom,76 the Strasbourg Court had 
explained that the meaning of imprisonment in the tort is not the same as the 
meaning of deprivation of liberty in Article 5. It had held that the distinction 
for the purposes of Article 5 between a deprivation of, and restriction 
upon, liberty is merely one of degree or intensity and not one of nature or 
substance.77 The House of Lords (in R. v. Bournewood Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust Ex parte L, the domestic case that was then considered 
at Strasbourg78) had considered the question from the point of view of the 
tort of false imprisonment, and considerable emphasis had been placed by the 
domestic courts on the fact that the applicant was compliant and had never 
attempted, or expressed the wish, to leave. The Court found, however, that 
the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to 
lose the benefi t of Convention protection for the single reason that he may 
have given himself up to be taken into detention,79 especially when it was not 
disputed that that person was legally incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing 
with, the proposed action. The Court went on to fi nd that the applicant was 
of unsound mind within Article 5(1)(e), but that there had been a violation of 
Article 5(1)80 due to the absence of procedural safeguards designed to protect 
against arbitrary deprivations of liberty on grounds of necessity. The case 
raised the question, if the detention of the claimants fell within Article 5(1), 
whether Article 5(1)(c) in particular was capable of authorising the detention 
of individuals whom the police neither suspected of criminality nor – it 
appeared – intended to bring before a court on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or to prevent them doing so. Once the cordon was lifted 
and dispersal occurred, it did not appear from the evidence of both sides that 
any consideration at all was given to arresting Austin or Saxby. When they 
asked to be allowed to leave earlier, they were not told by police that at some 
point they personally might be arrested. 
 The claimants argued that Article 5(1) was engaged by a deprivation of 
liberty short of arrest, especially one that was more than brief.81 It was found 
that Article 5(1) applied to the detentions: no one in the crowd was free to 
leave without permission; the detention was suffi cient physically to amount to 
a deprivation of liberty. The measure was a close confi nement, with minimal 
76 App. No. 45508/99, Decision of 5 October 2004.
77 Guzzardi v. Italy, Decision of 6 November 1980, 3 EHRR 333, at 92 and Ashingdane v. UK, 
Decision of 28 May 1985, 7 EHRR 528, at 41. 
78 (1999) 1 A.C. 458.
79 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, Decision of 18 June 1971, 1 EHRR 373, at 64-65.
80 Id., at 124.
81 Guenat v. Swizerland, App. No. 24722/94, (1995) 810A DR 130 and Hojemeister v. Germany, 
App. No. 9179/80, Decision of 6 July 1981, unreported, were relied upon. The domestic case of 
DPP v. Meaden, [2003] EWHC 3005 (Admin); [2004] 1 WLR 945 was also relied upon. 
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liberty in Oxford Circus; so the detention was a deprivation of liberty, rather 
than a restriction. If the only reason why police had detained the crowd had 
been to take temporary measures for the protection of members of the crowd 
themselves, this would not, it was found, amount to a deprivation of liberty. 
However, this was not found to be the case, and so there was a deprivation of 
liberty within Article 5(1). 
 The detention was imposed, the judge then found, with the conditional 
purpose of arresting those whom it would be lawful and practicable to arrest 
and bring before a judge, and to prevent such persons as might be so identifi ed 
from committing offences of violence. This was found to be capable of falling 
within Article 5(1)(c). In order to fall within Article 5(1)(c) the police had to 
be exercising a lawful power. It was found that powers to prevent a breach of 
the peace do not depend upon the threat of violence and that there was a power 
of temporary detention for so long as was necessary to protect the rights of 
others and consistent with public safety. 
 The judgment is not entirely clear, but essentially it proceeded on the basis 
that the police actions could be justifi able under Article 5(1)(c) on the ground 
that the detention was effected partly in order to arrest some persons at some 
future point on grounds of breach of the peace. The claimants relied on the 
fi nding in Lawless v. Ireland (No.3)82 that persons detained must be brought 
before the court in all cases to which Article 5(1)(c) refers. Their counsel 
also relied on Guzzardi v. Italy,83 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK,84 and 
Berktay v. Turkey 85 for the proposition that the suspicion has to relate to the 
person detained and to a concrete and specifi c offence. It was argued on behalf 
of the police that if the detainee is not taken before a court, but is released 
instead, then Article 5(1)(c) may be satisfi ed on the basis that the police had 
a “conditional” purpose to arrest.86 The test for deciding whether a measure 
short of arrest could lawfully be taken against a given individual was, it was 
found, reasonable suspicion that that individual was presenting the relevant 
threat. It may be noted that the two claimants were trapped within the cordon 
for a total of seven hours and during that time, on the evidence, committed no 
act that could be interpreted as meaning that they themselves were about to 
breach the peace. Saxby was – in effect – not in the company of the protesters 
voluntarily. 
 In assessing the preventive action that can be taken against persons who 
do not threaten to breach the peace, the judge relied on the Court of Appeal 
decision in Laporte; it was held: 
82 Decision of 1 July 1961, 1 EHRR 15, at 13-14.
83 Supra note 77, at 102.
84 Decision of 30 August 1990, 13 EHRR 157, at 34.
85 App. No. 22493/93, Decision of 1 March 2001, at 199.
86 The defence relied on Brogan v. UK, Decision of 29 November 1988, 11 EHRR 11, in which 
it was found at 52-53 that a “conditional” purpose can suffi ce to bring a case within Art. 5(1)(c).
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The important feature to note about the ability to take preventive action is that 
its justifi cation is not derived from the person against whom the action is taken 
having actually committed an offence, but based upon a need to prevent the 
apprehended breach of the peace. In some situations, preventing a breach of 
the peace will only be possible if action is taken which risks affecting a wholly 
innocent individual.87 
He said that none of the cases make it clear whether mere voluntary presence, 
which in fact encourages the principal, and which is intended to do so, is 
suffi cient, but he found that this should be the case and that that conclusion 
was consistent with the leading case of R. v. Coney on the point.88 He found 
that the voluntary presence of a defendant as part of a crowd engaged in 
threatening behaviour over a period of time and/or distance is suffi cient to 
raise a prima facie case against him on a charge of threatening behaviour, 
notwithstanding the absence of evidence of any act done by himself.89 The 
court commented that a high degree of respect should be shown towards a 
police offi cer’s assessment of the risk of what a crowd might do were it not 
contained, whilst also bearing in mind individuals’ human rights. 
 The judge further found that there was a public procession or assembly 
being held at Oxford Circus at 2 p.m., and the senior police offi cer reasonably 
believed that it might result in serious public disorder, serious damage 
to property, or serious disruption to the life of the community – these 
circumstances give rise to a statutory power to impose conditions under the 
Public Order Act 1986. The claimants argued that those powers could not 
provide a power to detain people, and could not be relied on after the event if 
not relied on at the time. But the judge found that directions pursuant to the 
Public Order Act 1986 Sections 12 and 14 were given, and the fact that none 
of the offi cers had the sections in mind was, the judge found, immaterial. 
The directions imposed conditions prohibiting the procession from entering 
any public place specifi ed. Those directions, the judge found, were necessary 
to prevent disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation, and the police had 
reasonable grounds to take this view. 
 The judge noted that it appeared to the offi cers detaining each claimant 
that a breach of the peace was about to be committed. When each claimant 
came forward and asked to be released, it appeared to the police that all those 
present within the cordon, including each claimant, were demonstrators, and 
in the particular circumstances of this case, that meant that they also appeared 
to the police to be about to commit that breach of the peace. The judge found 
that whilst this inference could be properly drawn in the instant case, it was 
87 Laporte case, supra note 2, at Para. 48.
88 (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534, CCR (non-accidental presence at an unlawful prize-fi ght capable of 
being encouragement); he also found it consistent with Wilcox v. Jeffrey [1951] 1 All E.R. 464, 
DC (intentional encouragement in fact by voluntary attendance at a concert performance known 
to be unlawful). 
89 Allan v. Ireland, 79 Cr.App.R. 206, DC.
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unlikely to be capable of being drawn in all crowd cases. It was found that 
the police also have a right, and perhaps a duty, to take measures short of 
arrest, sometimes called self-help, when there is unlawful conduct that does 
not amount to a breach of the peace. (In so far as this fi nding formed a part 
of the part of the judgment, it has now been overruled by the House of Lords’ 
judgment in Laporte.) The limits on these common law powers, he noted in 
passing, are by no means clear. 
 The measures that the offi cers took – in containing the claimants in Oxford 
Street – were found to be reasonable steps to prevent each claimant from 
breaking or threatening to break the peace. In determining reasonableness, 
the judge took account of the fact that members of the assembly were in 
breach of the conditions imposed under Sections 12 or 14 of the 1986 Act, 
although there had been no advertence to the imposition of conditions under 
the Act by the police. The judge did not make this entirely clear, but appeared 
to indicate that the police detention of the assembly related to the breach of 
Sections 12 or 14. This would have to presuppose that one of the conditions 
that could be imposed under Sections 12 or 14 was to detain the assembly for 
a substantial period of time. Leaving aside the question whether the police 
can invoke conditions under either Sections 12 or 14 without adverting to 
those powers, or communicating their use to the protesters, this fi nding is 
doubtful, since once the march becomes a static assembly it is subject to 
Section 14, which does not on its face allow for detention of the assembly, and 
case law has established that the condition must be imposed under the right 
section.90 However, as discussed above, the judge found that Section 14 could 
be interpreted to include a power to impose detention. 
 In assessing whether an arrest of the applicants, if undertaken, would have 
been reasonable, the judge noted that it is now recognised that “domestic 
courts must themselves form a judgment whether a Convention right has been 
breached” and that “the intensity of review is somewhat greater under the 
proportionality approach” [than under the Wednesbury approach].91 In relation 
to the intensity of scrutiny, the judge found that the Court should accord a high 
degree of respect for the police offi cers’ appreciation of the risks of what the 
members of the crowd might have done if not contained. At the same time, he 
found that the court should subject to very close scrutiny the practical effect 
that derogating measures have on individual human rights, the importance of 
the rights affected, and the robustness of any safeguards intended to minimise 
the impact of the derogating measures on individual human rights. The judge 
found that when each claimant came forward and asked to be released, the 
police did suspect that all those present within the cordon, including each 
claimant, were demonstrators, and that in the particular circumstances of this 
90 See DPP case, supra note 6.
91 R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532 
at 23, 27.
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case, that meant that they also appeared to the police to be about to commit 
that breach of the peace.92 The judge accepted the police evidence that it was 
not possible to differentiate between violent and non-violent demonstrators in 
order to determine who could, in principle, be subject to arrest. The judge held 
that the burden of proof was on the claimants to show that the exercise of the 
discretion to detain was unreasonable, either to the Wednesbury threshold, or 
to a more intense level of scrutiny.
 So, in summary, the detention of the claimants amounted to a breach of 
Article 5 but, it was found, it was justifi ed because they appeared to the police 
to be protesters and, as such, might commit a breach of the peace. The detention 
was imposed with the conditional purpose of arresting those whom it would 
be lawful and practicable to arrest and bring before a judge, and to prevent 
such persons as might be so identifi ed from committing offences of violence. 
It appeared to the offi cers detaining each claimant that each one, as members 
of the demonstration, was about to commit that breach of the peace and, the 
judge found, it so appeared on reasonable grounds. So the detention was found 
to be justifi ed under Article 5(1)(c). On the basis of the use of the breach of the 
peace doctrine, taking account of the breach of Sections 12 or 14, the claims 
of breach of Article 5 were found to fail in respect of both claimants. 
 It was further found, in relation to the claim of false imprisonment, that 
the claimants had been imprisoned within the cordon, but that the police had a 
defence of necessity in so trapping them, which defeated the false imprisonment 
claim. In putting forward that defence, it was found that the police had to show 
that they reasonably suspected that the claimants presented a relevant threat 
and that it had been reasonable to use their discretion to detain them. The 
existence of the defence of necessity in tort had been affi rmed by the House of 
Lords in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v. Southport Corp.93 The police, it was found, 
can take measures for the protection of everyone, and a reasonable measure 
taken in this instance, involving minimum use of force, was, it was found, 
to detain the crowd until dispersal could be arranged safely. The claimants 
argued that there were alternative and less restrictive measures open to the 
police and that therefore the police had acted negligently, defeating the defence 
of necessity. This was rejected by the judge on the basis that in the diffi cult 
circumstances the police had acted reasonably. The need to take the action of 
creating the cordon did not arise out of any negligence on the part of the police, 
it was found. The claimants, he found, as members of the crowd, would, if not 
subject to police control, have presented as much of an innocent threat to other 
members of the crowd as every other innocent member presented to them. He 
found that one of the reasons for which the police took the contested actions 
was to prevent serious injury, and possible death, to persons for whom they 
92 Id., at Para. 129. 
93 [1955] 3 All E.R. 864, [1956] A.C. 218.
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were responsible, including police offi cers, members of the crowd and third 
parties, as well as to protect property. 
 The judge concluded by saying that no case was advanced at the trial to the 
effect that the police were adopting tactics designed to interfere with rights 
of assembly and freedom of speech. He ended by stating that the case was 
about the right to liberty, and public order, and not about freedom of speech or 
freedom of assembly.94
 This is a very signifi cant and very worrying judgment for public protest. 
It means that the police can use this doctrine against protesters in order to: 
arrest them; detain them for several hours, without arresting them; stop an 
assembly or march; divert an assembly or march; or disperse most or all of 
it. The power to do all this arises if some members of the group have been 
involved in disorder in the past, or intelligence suggests that this is the case, 
or if some members are disorderly, or appear likely to become disorderly. The 
“conditional purpose” to arrest some persons is suffi cient to allow the power 
of prolonged detention to be exercised even if in the event no attempt to arrest 
those detained is made or – it appears – even considered. These powers are 
so broad that the use of the statutory scheme under the 1986 or 1994 Acts 
becomes almost irrelevant. In most circumstances, all the Sections 12 or 14 
powers can be exercised by way of the breach of the peace doctrine. The degree 
of deference accorded to the police in this judgment makes it very diffi cult to 
assess after the event the risk in fact posed at the time by protesters. The 
judgment came very close to suggesting that taking part in any protest during 
which a few protesters were disorderly, or showed a propensity to disorder, 
renders all members of the protest liable to all the powers listed – and a range 
of other ones as well. For example, as the protesters (and any bystanders, such 
as Saxby, trapped with them) were allowed to fi lter through the cordon, names 
and addresses were taken and they were fi lmed. 
 The key point, it is argued, at which this judgment fell into error was 
in fi nding that if protesters are in the company of other protesters who are 
disorderly or may become disorderly, even though they themselves have 
shown no propensity at all to disorder over a long period of time, they become 
liable to detention or arrest. It is argued that that fi nding is completely opposed 
to the spirit of Article 5 (and Articles 10 and 11), and that a notional, tokenistic 
“conditional purpose to arrest” on that basis is not suffi cient to justify the 
detention under Article 5(1)(c), given the strong fi ndings in Guzzardi v. Italy,95 
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK,96 and Berktay v. Turkey 97 as to the need for 
suspicion of a specifi c offence relating to the person in question. The specifi c 
‘offence’ would have to be breaching the peace, but it is greatly stretching 
94 Id., at 607 and 608. 
95 Supra note 77, at 102.
96 Supra note 84, at 34.
97 Supra note 85, at 199.
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the defi nition from Howell to fi nd that protesters such as Austin who have 
behaved entirely peacefully throughout the whole period of time can be said 
to be liable for arrest for that ‘offence.’ A fortiori those remarks can be applied 
to bystanders such as Saxby who are only in the company of the protesters 
because they have been forced into it by the police! Saxby could not have 
been said to have encouraged those breaching the peace by his presence or 
intending to do so since he was not part of the protest. Clearly, he, in common 
with the others, was annoyed at being trapped by the police – although he 
remained peaceful – but that was a consequence of the actions of the police, 
not part of encouragement to others to engage in disorderly or violent protest. 
Austin’s only ‘offence’ was to take part in a protest during which some people, 
not the majority, were disorderly or aggressive. It is argued that the police had 
ample opportunity – seven hours in total, or more – to observe the behaviour 
of the protesters and could have made greater efforts to allow some persons 
to leave, differentiating between peaceful and non-peaceful protesters in so 
doing. Article 5 was breached, it is argued, at some point during those seven 
hours in relation to both Austin and Saxby. It was, it is contended, breached 
at the point when an argument that they personally could be liable to arrest 
at some future point would have become implausible had even superfi cial 
enquiries been made. Both Austin and Saxby communicated with police about 
their circumstances; that could have been the point at which both should have 
been allowed to leave, in a carefully controlled dispersal from the Square. 
After that point had come and passed, the continued detention, it is argued, 
breached Article 5 and damages should have been awarded that refl ected the 
length of that period. 
 The House of Lords’ decision in Laporte differs greatly from this one in 
its treatment of the Convention dimension. It takes the Convention rights in 
question more seriously and adopts a stricter level of scrutiny in relation to 
the judgments of the offi cers at the time. The situations in the two instances 
were roughly comparable, in that in each offi cers chose to detain protesters on 
grounds of apprehension of a breach of the peace rather than arresting them 
or allowing them to proceed with the protest. In each instance, completely 
peaceful protesters were engaged in a protest in the company of a small 
number of disorderly or potentially violent protesters, and in each instance 
this led to their detention. The House of Lords indicated that the police should 
have made more effort to distinguish between peaceful and non-peaceful 
protesters in exercising powers to prevent a breach of the peace. However, 
in Laporte, the police, crucially, did not think that a breach of the peace was 
imminent, although they thought one might arise if the protesters continued, 
whereas in Austin and Saxby it appeared that the police did think that a breach 
was imminent at the point when the detention occurred. The House of Lords’ 
decision merely limited the use of the immense panoply of powers available 
under the breach of the peace doctrine to situations where the imminence 
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of the breach of the peace would warrant arrest. Since in Austin the police 
appeared to take the view that they could have made arrests at the entrance to 
Oxford Square, the outcome of the decision is not out of harmony – except on 
the point noted above – with that of the House of Lords. Therefore, most of 
the fi ndings in Austin still stand, despite the later House of Lords’ decision in 
Laporte. 
 The judge considered that Articles 10 and 11 were not engaged in this 
instance since Saxby was not seeking to exercise rights under those Articles 
on that occasion and Austin had already had an opportunity to exercise them. 
She had used her loudspeaker to broadcast political messages before the march 
arrived at Oxford Square and thereafter for a period. When she was told she 
could not leave and was imprisoned in the cordon, she used her loudspeaker 
to comfort those who were trapped in the Square. It is argued, however, that 
the judge’s conception of the exercise of Articles 10 and 11 rights was a very 
narrow one. Austin was trammelled as to the place and time that she could 
exercise those rights and the situation in which she could exercise them. The 
messages she could broadcast were circumscribed by the situation. Austin’s 
intentions in joining the protest would have been to exercise the rights as 
part of the march, when they could have been publicized more effectively 
to passers-by, not as part of a group of prisoners trapped by the police on 
one spot in very uncomfortable conditions. Further, this judgment – which 
confi rms and extends already very broad powers – is not in harmony with the 
spirit of Articles 10 or 11. If protesters risk arrest or detention when joining 
protests they may be deterred from doing so. 
 Was the tort of false imprisonment interpreted consistently with Article 
5 in this case? It is suggested that the application of the defence of necessity 
as interpreted in this case is inconsistent with Article 5 since none of the 
exceptions in Article 5 cover the defence. In order to align the two, the tort 
should be reinterpreted to exclude that defence; the position should be that a 
detention cannot be torturous if a lawful arrest, or a detention short of arrest, 
based on a clear power, and covered by Article 5(1)(c) (or (b)), has occurred. 
If the judge considered that apprehension of a breach of the peace provided a 
lawful power to detain for a substantial period without arrest, it is unclear why 
it was thought that the defence of necessity was relevant in any event. 
 Austin and Saxby has confi rmed that the police have a very wide range of 
powers to use even against entirely peaceful protesters if a few protesters are or 
may be disorderly. Clearly, the police are faced with diffi culties in controlling 
a protest such as that which occurred on May Day in 2001. However, trapping 
three thousand people for seven hours is a highly unusual event; it has not 
occurred before or since. That suggests that the police do not normally need 
to resort to such tactics, which of course could be counter-productive. It is 
suggested that if further powers to control protests are needed, Parliament 
should enact them in preference to any further distortions of an already very 
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broad common law doctrine in order to provide a legal underpinning for 
police action. This judgment gave the impression of trying to fi nd, after the 
event, legal justifi cation for police action; in so doing it created a number 
of extensions to this doctrine. The decision in Laporte may signal to judges 
that they need to rein in this doctrine rather than extending it, so it is possible 
that a repeat of decisions such as this one will not recur. The police in Austin 
could have employed Sections 12 and 14 of the 1986 Act against the protest 
beforehand, but chose not to. Curtailment of this common law doctrine might 
encourage the police to employ the statutory framework that is already in place 
in order to manage protests – and Lord Bingham clearly signalled in Laporte 
not only that the Convention rights under the HRA had brought about a clear 
change in the constitutional position of rights to expression and assembly, but 
that the common law should not be allowed to marginalize or undermine that 
framework. 
Conclusions6. 
Before the HRA came into force, the true boundaries of public protest were 
drawn, not by reference to the constitutional signifi cance in a democracy of 
rights of political participation or of affording expression, through the medium 
of forms of protest, to a variety of viewpoints, but often arbitrarily due to the 
imprecision of the law and the approach frequently taken to it in low level courts 
or by the police. In 2000 it was tempting to look forward to the use of Articles 
10 and 11 in the post-HRA era in the expectation, not only that the boundaries 
would eventually be re-drawn more precisely, but also that legal discourse in 
this area would no longer focus simply on disorder, but rather would seek to 
engage in the ongoing debate, at Strasbourg and in other jurisdictions, as to the 
values underlying the constitutional signifi cance of protest and the weight they 
should be afforded. The question whether that expectation would be fulfi lled 
depended partly on the readiness of the domestic judiciary to disregard the 
outcomes of many of the public protest cases that Strasbourg has considered. 
But it was also suggested that the impact of the HRA on public protest would 
be principally determined, not by the Strasbourg jurisprudence it introduced, 
but by the prevailing and established judicial attitude to public protest, and 
the extent to which the judiciary might be prepared to move away from it, by 
giving practical effect to the core values underlying the Convention. Vital, 
also, was the way that the judiciary were likely to deal with the problematic 
issue of the margin of appreciation and its role in the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
As we have seen, reliance on the outcomes of cases at Strasbourg provides no 
secure grounding for such protection – rather the reverse. 
 How far have those expectations been answered, nearly seven years on? 
This paper has on the whole painted a dismal picture. Over-broad statutory 
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provisions have been broadened still further by incremental extension; in 
some post-HRA cases lip service only has tended to be paid to questions of 
proportionality. The breach of the peace doctrine has been used extensively by 
police against protesters over most of the HRA period prior to Laporte with 
little attempt by the judiciary, except in Redmond-Bate,98 to hold it in check, 
the low point being Austin and Saxby. The fi nding that three thousand mainly 
peaceful protesters could be trapped for seven hours in a London square, and 
that an entirely peaceful protester and a bystander caught up in the protest had 
no redress for the detention, must be one of the low points of the domestic 
public protest jurisprudence. However, the House of Lords’ decision in 
Laporte may signal a change of stance going well beyond its specifi c outcome. 
In future post-HRA decisions judges inclined to take the more activist or 
pro-free assembly stance may be prepared to fi nd where necessary that their 
decision-making can be rooted in the general principles upheld at Strasbourg 
as underpinning the Convention, rather than in its particular application. The 
judiciary can draw upon the general principles and values underlying the 
Convention – free expression, pluralism, tolerance and the maintenance of 
diversity as essential characteristics of a democratic society – if the HRA is 
to provide more than a cosmetic change in approach to the protection of the 
right of peaceful protest. The Convention jurisprudence clearly recognises 
the need to protect a plurality of views in a democracy, even in the face of 
offence caused to the majority. It would be in accordance with the Convention 
concept of a democratic society to refuse to place those seeking to exercise 
communicative rights in the same position as football hooligans and to reject 
a legal tradition of valuing the general societal interest in public order over 
the exercise of such rights. In accordance with the values of the Convention, 
safeguarding the interests of minorities in a democracy is not to circumvent 
the democratic process, but to uphold it by obviating the danger that those 
interests will be marginalised. 
 If the judiciary are prepared to take this stance more strongly in the coming 
years, the nature and structure of judicial argument in public protest cases, as 
well as the likely outcomes, will change radically. Although some judges have 
tended post-HRA towards approaches that have been termed ‘minimalist’ or 
‘traditionalist,’ as in Austin, the rather tokenistic changes in legal reasoning 
that are resulting may still eventually come to infl uence judicial attitudes. In 
public order cases such judges are hearing, even if they are unreceptive to, 
arguments from counsel as to the value of this form of political expression. 
Now that the judiciary are placed in the position of considering such value 
and the need, nevertheless, to circumscribe protest within a democracy, they 
may eventually come to view this matter from a broader perspective and to 
participate in the debate that has been occurring in other jurisdictions for many 
98 Redmond-Bate v. DPP 163 JP 789, [1999] Crim LR 998, 7 BHRC 375 Queen’s Bench 
Division.
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years. Laporte appears to signal a receptivity to that approach – an approach 
which shows a sensitivity to the rights potentially being curtailed. Ultimately, 
in this particular area of political expression, the Act may be beginning to have 
a more profoundly educative effect than in others, not only on the public, but 
also on the judiciary.
